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“SEA OF PEACE” OR SEA OF WAR
Russian Maritime Hybrid Warfare in the Baltic Sea
Martin Murphy and Gary Schaub Jr.

O

vernight on February 26–27, 2014, Russian forces invaded the Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Twenty-eight days later they had completed the first forced
transfer of territory to take place in Europe since 1945. The transfer was effected
by small groups of armed men (the so-called little green men) who appeared at
strategic points all across Crimea. These men, Russian president Vladimir Putin
assured the world at a press conference on March 4, were nothing to do with him.
They were, he said, “local self-defense forces.”1
In reality, they were Russian personnel permitted and deployed to use force
on Ukrainian territory. They used it to confine Ukrainian forces to their bases;
take control of all media outlets and communications channels, to ensure that the
only news the population of Crimea saw or heard was controlled by Russia; take
over government offices, to ensure that the only decisions taken were approved
by them; and occupy the Crimean assembly, guaranteeing that it voted to approve
a plebiscite, which eventually would return a near–Soviet era approval rating of
93 percent for the (re)unification of Crimea with Mother Russia.
Putin later admitted that his earlier denial about Russian involvement was
untrue, and that the entire operation had been planned at and conducted by the
highest levels of the Russian government.2 The move, in blatant contravention
of international law, challenged the very foundations of the postwar European
order.3
Ironically, most observers at the time believed that what they were seeing was
the first moves in a Russian offensive, one that amounted to a new approach to
warfare. In fact, it was the final move in a campaign against Ukraine that had begun years earlier, and the reinvigoration of a form of warfare Russia has practiced
since the Bolshevik Revolution.
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The most absurd reaction came from Martin Schulz, then the president of the
European Parliament, when he asked how “war could become a genuine possibility in a country which shares a border with the European Union.”4 The most
informed came from Latvian foreign minister Edgars Rinkēvičs, who noted that
the “Crimea scenario resembles the occupation of the Baltic states by the USSR
in 1940.”5
The governments and peoples of the Baltic States recognized immediately that
they too were once again in the Kremlin’s sights.6 Since then they have remained
very much alive to the prospect of Russian destabilization and even outright invasion. This article will focus on the aspect of that possibility that has received the
least attention: destabilization at and from the Baltic Sea itself.
If that destabilization is to occur, it will be maritime in origin. It will be, for the
most part, nonlethal and nonnaval. The Russian Baltic Sea Fleet will have a role,
but for the most part it will be as a threatening over-the-horizon presence tasked
with dissuading NATO from interfering; what it will not do is engage NATO
naval forces in pitched battle. The tools of the confrontation will be largely political, diplomatic, informational, psychological, and economic. If physical force
becomes necessary, the units performing it will be paramilitary, such as coast and
border guards, special operations forces (SOFs), and regular forces disguised as
local-defense forces and civilians. Regular forces will be deployed in a regular
manner only after any campaign, and only if absolutely necessary to consolidate
gains and “keep order.”
We begin by asking why Russia would want to disrupt what it once termed a
“sea of peace”; the short answer is that the Baltic Sea region (BSR) offers Russia
a point of relatively high political leverage vis-à-vis NATO and the West. We will
examine the concept of hybrid warfare, emphasizing its political and informationwarfare dimensions, and suggest how it could be applied in and from the Baltic
Sea itself. We will look briefly at maritime hybrid warfare in practice and suggest that Russia will see clear parallels with its own land-based approach (even as
the leaders of China and Iran are likely to admire and even envy the speed and
aggression with which Russia achieves its aims, compared with their own morecautious approaches). Finally, we will argue for measures that the BSR states can
take to mitigate the effects of possible Russian hybrid aggression.
WHAT IS HYBRID WAR?
Most observers of Russian actions in Ukraine point, quite correctly, to the 2008
conflict in Georgia as the precursor. It validated the use of military force and the
employment of irregular units and proxies as a foreign policy tool, while demonstrating that strategic gains could be achieved at little long-term cost.7 The Che
chen wars (1994–96 and 1999–2009), however, had a more profound impact on
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Russian military and political thinking than the brief Georgian conflict. While the
Chechens eventually were defeated by the application of overwhelming force, the
Russians found their opponents’ fusion of unconventional military tactics with
information warfare (IW) and psychological operations difficult to deal with.8
Russia was successful in Crimea because it had learned the lesson of Chechnya
and built on its partial success in Georgia in ways that reinvigorated two longstanding instruments of its power: its armed forces and its capacity for intensive
IW.9 When Frank Hoffman defined hybrid warfare in 2007, he made it clear that
it could be conducted by states as well as nonstate actors.10 He returned to this
point in a later essay, arguing that hybrid warfare was one of a number of lenses
through which Russian actions should be analyzed, including protracted, ambiguous, irregular, and gray-zone warfare.11
The term gray zone best captures the orchestrated multidimensionality of
Russian actions that are calibrated to gain specified strategic objectives without
crossing the threshold of overt conflict—actions that appear to be aimed at exploiting a Western (and specifically U.S.) strategic culture that, unlike Russian
military practice, conceptualizes war and peace as two distinct conditions.12
This binary divide presents enemies with a seam they can exploit. Actions that
in Western eyes are ambiguous—such as Russia’s operations in Crimea, which it
disguised with a substantial disinformation campaign—play well in this seam.13
Russia, however, has demonstrated vividly that it will “pulse” its actions, moving
from nonviolence to violence when it judges the risks to be acceptable, and back
again when they are not.14
If gray-zone conflicts fall short of violent warfare, hybrid conflicts most certainly do not: they are ones in which adversaries employ a “fused mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, catastrophic terrorism, and criminal behavior
in the battlespace to obtain desired political objectives.”15 In eastern Ukraine, for
example, where nonviolent and ambiguous methods met with less success, Russia did not hesitate to deploy regular forces in support of an irregular proxy force
that, acting in classic irregular fashion, fought to erode the Ukrainian government’s “power, legitimacy, and will.”16
The problem, of course, is that the Russian invasions of Crimea and eastern
Ukraine were more than purely military adventures. As the Defence and Security Committee of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly noted in its 2015 draft
report on hybrid warfare, “the new arena for the strategic competition between
Russia and NATO is actually more likely to be played out at the Article 4 level.”17
Countering such incursions by Russia in the future will require more than the
deployment or rotation of military forces. For the West, agreeing on such responses, coordinating their implementation, and putting them in effect promptly
will give rise to considerable intergovernmental challenges.18 Budgets will be
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one: ensuring every NATO nation raises its defense outlays to 2 percent of gross
domestic product will add little to the resources needed to counter the political,
information, cyber, and subversive aspects of hybrid warfare if they are expended
solely on big-ticket items such as fighter aircraft.19
NAVAL HYBRID WARFARE
Hybrid warfare as deployed by Russia in Crimea and subsequently in eastern
Ukraine has received considerable analytical coverage.20 By comparison, hybrid
warfare at sea has received rather less consideration.21 The geography of the
Crimean and eastern Ukrainian theaters, combined with the circumstances of
the incursions, has meant the naval role has been limited in both, although naval
activity did take place in and around the port of Sevastopol, where an aged Russian cruiser was sunk at the entrance to prevent five Ukrainian warships from
leaving.22
Therefore, given that Russia, to date, has not extended its hybrid-warfare capability to the maritime domain, it is worth diverting the discussion for a moment
to review what China and, to a much lesser extent, Iran have been able to achieve.
In the South and East China Seas, China has deployed a layered maritime
force consisting of fishing vessels supported by a maritime militia backed by its
recently formed China Coast Guard to conduct operations at a level of conflict
below anything that justifies an armed response.23 Chinese-language publications
talk openly about these ambiguous agencies with their numerous cutters as being
the tip of the spear for carrying out China’s maritime strategy.24 The role of the
People’s Liberation Army Navy is to stay in the background, making its presence
felt from over the horizon.
This combination of naval force and naval proxies is brought together with an
IW campaign consisting of diplomatic pressure, menacing media stories, economic incentives, boycott threats, accusations that its enemies are militarizing
the situation, spurious claims of historical rights, and perverse and self-serving
interpretations of international maritime law. Meanwhile, China has been changing the facts on the ground. In the South China Sea, this has involved building
artificial islands; and in the East China Sea, declaring an air-defense identification zone that, by overlapping with those of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, is
intentionally destabilizing.25
Iran’s attempts to use hybrid-warfare techniques to remake the Middle East
have been inhibited by U.S. interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the sanctions the international community has imposed to force Iran to give up its nuclear
program.26 The same impediments also have limited the country’s naval actions
in the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Navy has been operationally and tactically innovative despite severely restricted
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/9
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technology, like the Russian armed forces before 2008. It has planned and exercised to fight guerrilla warfare at sea, using “hit and run attacks with sea[-] and
land-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, mines, mini-subs and suicide boats.”27
Both China and Iran have engaged in extensive harassing behavior aimed at
deterring foreign warships and military aircraft from operating close to their
coasts. This was standard Soviet practice against NATO assets until it was curtailed by mutual agreement. Russia now has resumed similar operations, with
multiple incidents taking place on and over the Baltic and Black Seas.28 At the
same time, Russia has resumed Soviet-style probing missions against NATO
countries, while the Baltic States, Sweden, and Finland all have had their territorial waters and airspace compromised.29
The Chinese have made extensive use of their maritime paramilitary forces
to assert maritime claims and to deny neighboring states access to waters for
fishing and resource-extraction purposes. The opportunities for the disruptive
use of coast guard and border forces appear to be fewer in the BSR, as all but a
few maritime borders are agreed; a well-established system for settling fishery,
environmental-protection, and other issues is in place; and, for such a small
geographic space, the diversity of coast guard and border-force organizations is
considerable.30 Yet Russian behavior—for instance, withholding ratification of
the Narva Bay and Gulf of Finland treaty because the Estonians have “created
tensions” by protesting against violations of their airspace—demonstrates that
the Russians are maintaining the potential for disruption inherent in the handful
of disputes that remain.31
RUSSIA AND THE BSR
While common sense suggests that Russia should be a status quo power, given
its economic weakness and strategic vulnerability, it clearly is not—Russia is a
revisionist power.32 It wants to revise the existing regional order unilaterally, albeit at the least possible political and military cost to itself. It wants to diminish
U.S. power and replace the unipolar with a multipolar world. To achieve that, it
needs to test U.S. strength when and where it can. The Putin regime also needs
an enemy it can blame to divert attention from its own failures.
Geographic and Strategic Dimensions
The Baltic States lie at the point where American power is most extended and
Russian power can be concentrated most easily.33 Testing the strength of a great
power often begins by testing the strength of its allies and the resilience of their
mutual allegiance. America’s allies have given it many advantages over the past
seventy-five years; but now, when America’s power is in relative decline, coercion
of its allies on the periphery will test the limits of its strength and the support it
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could provide those states should Russia choose to escalate. Russia is under no
illusion that it can fight the United States directly, or a coalition of America’s core
allies, although local or regional superiority is well within its grasp. That is not its
intent. It will want to stay below the level of direct confrontation.34
However, it is important to recognize that it “might be entirely possible that
the Putin regime evaluates costs and benefits in a way different from what the
West assumes.”35 If Russian leaders believe that the political and military risks are
acceptable or warranted, they may exercise military options up to and including the nuclear level.36 If Russia could engineer a situation to warrant military
action against a NATO member, so that it was responding to a situation rather
than provoking a crisis, the reward of weakening NATO and calling into question America’s value as an ally would be extraordinary, as it would revise current
European and global power balances and perhaps merit the costs to be paid.
If the overarching reason for a Russian attack is to revise the regional order, the
potential triggers for such action in the BSR are plentiful, and not just in the Baltic
States. Keir Giles offers a wise reminder that a “distinctly Russian concept of what
constitutes national security, and a view of international relations which is at odds
with that held in the rest of Europe, mean that—as was the case with Ukraine—
assessing actions and reactions by criteria that seem rational in Western capitals
will be of limited use.”37 He cites a Finnish government study that concludes
bluntly, “Russia’s sore points are almost invariably psychological and tactical.”38
The most obvious point of leverage is the Russian minorities (Russia refers to
them as “compatriots”) who reside in the Baltic States. Others have addressed this
subject at length.39 It will not be revisited here except to note that there are concentrations of ethnic Russians in key maritime areas of each Baltic state.40 In Estonia, ethnic Russians constitute over 70 percent of the population in the county
of Ida-Virumaa in the northeasternmost part of the country.41 It contains most
of Estonia’s energy resources, primarily oil shale, and is bounded to the north by
the Gulf of Finland, to the south by Lake Peipus (shared with Russia), and to the
east by Russia itself. Russians also make up over 30 percent of the population in
the area in and around the capital and port city of Tallinn. In Latvia, ethnic Russians make up over 40 percent of the population in the capital and port city of
Riga, 20–30 percent in its suburbs, 30–40 percent in the port city of Liepaja, and
20–30 percent in the port city of Ventspils, with larger concentrations inland on
the border with Russia.42 Finally, there are no significant concentrations of ethnic Russians in port or shore areas in Lithuania, although they constitute 10–20
percent of the populace of the capital, Vilnius.43
Nor are the Baltics removed from Russia’s deeply ingrained sense of insecurity
arising from its loss of strategic depth. Advancing the Russian right flank to the
Baltic Sea would offer only a marginal increase in its own security, but would
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right a perceived wrong, prevent the encirclement of Kaliningrad—the main base
of the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet—and provide a platform from which Russia could
threaten the entire Baltic Sea littoral. From a NATO perspective, the Baltic States
are vulnerable geographically: they are flat, offer few natural defensive features,
and lack strategic depth of their own—it is only 150 miles from the Russian border to Riga. Greater depth could come only from either operations from a sea
base steaming in the Baltic Sea—an exceptionally hazardous proposition against
Russian land-based airpower and quiet submarines—or NATO operation from
bases in Sweden and Finland.
Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO; they are unlikely to join in the
immediate future; and if they did join, they would do so in tandem. Nonetheless,
the Finnish government has stated it may apply at any time, while Swedish public
opinion has displayed some volatility, with a positive showing in 2015 falling back
again in 2016.44 One of the factors influencing opinion in both places has been
increasingly aggressive incursions into the airspace of both countries, including
what appeared to be a simulated nuclear attack on Sweden’s capital, Stockholm.45
More recently Sweden, which had withdrawn its army garrison from the strategically important island of Gotland after the Cold War, brought forward its return,
in a move some observers attributed to a specific intelligence warning.46 At the
same time, towns and cities across Sweden were told to make preparations against
a possible military attack.47 Conscription also has been reintroduced.48 However, any move by either state to join NATO—thereby meaningfully increasing
NATO’s strategic depth—could “provoke Russia to launch a pre-emptive provocation in order to demonstrate the alliance’s weakness” and deter either country
from proceeding with its application.49
Finally, it is not even clear that a prolonged campaign against the West, including the BSR, is not under way already.50 Russian statements in nuclear matters
exceed even the rhetoric of the Cold War, while in domestic matters accusations
that the United States is attempting to overthrow the Russian government and
widespread reports of Russian interference in Western elections suggest that
President Putin and his inner circle believe conflict with the West has begun.51
If that is the case, the various measures taken in Georgia, Ukraine, and, most
recently, Syria signal their willingness to use every means at their disposal to
counter what they perceive as subversive Western actions.
Political and IW Dimensions
The BSR is a peripheral region, and only three things matter when it comes to its
security: (1) how much the core NATO powers, especially the United States, are
prepared to commit to the region’s defense, (2) whether Russia’s determination
to restore its sphere of influence in the region exceeds NATO’s commitment to
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prevent it, and (3) how important it is to Russia to probe Western weakness and
undermine its archenemy.
For some twenty years, the United States has viewed central and eastern Europe (CEE) as stable, secure, and steadily more prosperous. This is not a view
the Baltic States share. They remember the Soviet Union’s messy exit from their
territory and are conscious of the ties that still bind them to their former imperial ruler. Their Nordic neighbors, having observed Russian actions in Ukraine
and Russia’s increasingly aggressive stance in the BSR, have come to share many
of their fears.
The invasion of Crimea instilled a belief in Russia’s leadership that it is possible to take bold military action without prompting a Western military response.
NATO may possess the capability to blunt and most likely defeat a thrust against
it, but Russia just does not believe that Europe’s will to use force in any way
matches its own.52 Moreover, the intervention in eastern Ukraine may have reinforced the belief that to succeed in a probing action Russia cannot allow itself
to be bogged down, but instead needs to act swiftly and decisively if and when a
political opportunity presents itself. The new National Defense Control Center in
Moscow is intended to facilitate such swift and coordinated action.53
It may well be true, as Keir Giles notes, that “Russia’s borders are, for its leadership, provisional—determined by accidents of history—and to be adjusted when
necessary.”54 But NATO is falling into the trap of concentrating on military measures to defend the Baltic States, when in fact the challenge it will face is the deployment of all arms of Russian power to identify and exploit political, economic,
and military vulnerabilities in Russia’s target states and the Western alliance. “[I]n
the Baltic context, Russia’s strategy aims to weaken NATO’s willingness to follow
through on its own deterrent threats. Military solutions overlook this dimension
of Russian hybrid warfare because they focus disproportionately on modifying or
restructuring military capabilities.”55
The political dimension has been underplayed in NATO’s thinking, a tendency reinforced by the military nature of the organization’s charter and institutional culture. “A year ago, NATO’s discussion of Baltic defense was couched in
terms of hybrid warfare and ‘little green men.’ Today it is much more focused on
conventional military issues and the danger of nuclear escalation.”56 The point is
that the organization needs to concern itself with both. Questions remain regarding whether NATO’s own legal framework, and the instruments with which it
traditionally has worked, are sufficient to deal with these nonmilitary challenges,
and certainly whether they are able to respond to a fast-changing situation.57
Recalling NATO preparations for Soviet coercion and limited aggression during
the Cold War is a useful reminder of what can be achieved militarily but is largely
irrelevant in the current circumstances.58 Yes, the means Russia is prepared to use
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/9
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now to deceive and confuse NATO and the West are based on the same tools it
used then, but it has adapted them to the mores of a social-media environment
that lacks the experience to judge the import of Russian messaging and actions.59
Edward Lucas writes that Russia “exploits Western perceptions of abnormality
and normality . . . such as when it convinced a large portion of world opinion
that Russian-speakers in Ukraine were being persecuted by the new leadership
in Kiev [and] by claiming that NATO also engages in intimidatory military aviation exercises.”60 In a BSR scenario, the Kremlin’s deceptive messaging would be
filtered through Western media that culturally are attuned to look for moral
equivalence, and therefore are predisposed to find failings in the West’s response.
This would confuse Western publics and complicate matters for Western decision
makers, possibly slowing down any response until it was too late. “Russia could
then declare air and sea exclusion zones in the region on the pretext that this prevents military escalation.”61 Giles and his colleagues express this more succinctly.
Russian information campaigns, they write, “need not even remotely resemble
the truth to be successful.”62
If Russian aggression were allowed to reach this point, NATO would be faced
with an unenviable dilemma: attempt to recapture NATO territory occupied
directly or indirectly by Russia, or negotiate. Russia almost certainly would be
open to negotiations: effect matters more than territory, and the demands it could
impose would be humiliating. If NATO attempted to dislodge Russian forces
militarily, Moscow immediately would brand it a coaggressor against the Russian minority. NATO also would have to decide how it would respond to Russian
occupation of an island in the Baltic Sea such as Bornholm, or to nuclear threats
and, possibly, a “de-escalatory” Russian nuclear strike.
MARITIME HYBRID OPPORTUNITIES IN THE BSR
However, Russia’s high-end forces—including the Baltic Sea Fleet—would not
constitute the first movers in a hybrid conflict. They should be regarded as deterrents to local resistance and intervention by NATO and other Nordic states. Russia would rather practice more-ambiguous methods. Aside from Moscow’s ability
to manipulate the loyalty of Russian expatriate communities in the Baltic States,
many of the points where it can apply pressure lie on or under the Baltic Sea itself.
Geographically Isolated Islands and Disputed Borders
The obverse of the geographic advantage of concentration that Russia enjoys
is the geographic separation of Danish, Swedish, and Finnish islands that have
considerable strategic significance: whoever holds them could influence the outcome of any conflict. Many are ideal as bases, supply points, staging areas, and
jumping-off points for SOF operations and ambushes, while bays, fjords, and
peninsulas provide hiding places and launch points for fast raiders.
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The Danish island of Bornholm is positioned ideally to serve as a Russian
advanced base; it is worth recalling that Soviet forces occupied it in 1945.63 The
Swedish island of Gotland offers whichever power controls it dominance over
all sea routes and much of the airspace over the Baltic Sea and its littorals, which
explains why Sweden has moved to regarrison the island.64 The Åland Islands, located at the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, are Finnish territory, but were demilitarized in 1856, a status that has been confirmed twice since then. They overlook
the narrow entrance to the Gulf of Finland. During World War II, German forces
blocked this passage with mines and nets, successfully confining the Soviet Baltic
Sea Fleet to its bases. Finland is known to have plans to remilitarize the waters
around these islands in the event of conflict, as their location dominates all sea
movement in the northern part of the Baltic Sea.65 Russia has practiced invading
all three locations.66
Undersea Cables
Modern economies depend on an information and communications–technology
infrastructure that is remarkably vulnerable. “Today, roughly 95 percent of intercontinental communications traffic—e-mails, phone calls, money transfers, and
so on—travels not by air or through space but underwater,” through fiber-optic
cables, most no thicker than a garden hose.67
When it comes to the Baltic Sea particularly, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia
have only a few nodes that need be severed, while Estonia, the Nordic countries,
and Germany have much more redundancy available in their connections. Still,
the disruption of communications by severing these undersea cables would cause
severe economic distress in the region for a considerable period and would be
difficult to mitigate, even for those countries with multiple nodes. These cables
therefore would be a prime target in a hybrid-warfare campaign. As a former
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Admiral James Stavridis, USN (Ret.), has
written, “The tactical reasons for doing so are plain: in the case of heightened
tensions, access to the underwater cable system represents a rich trove of intelligence, a potential major disruption to an enemy’s economy and a symbolic chest
thump for the Russian Navy.”68 While cutting cables would remove an important
conduit for disinformation, tapping into them and ultimately cutting them would
contribute significantly to a campaign designed to create instability in the targeted states and societies, making state authorities look weak as they pressured
cable owners to restore services.
Energy Supplies
There long has been a recognition that states’ dependence on Russian energy
supplies, particularly among former Eastern Bloc countries—in this case, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—exposes them to the possibility of economic
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss2/9
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coercion.69 These states have pursued policies to reduce their dependence on
Russian supplies of oil, natural gas, coal, and electricity, but the advantage that
accrues to Russia—given the infrastructure investments necessary to diversify
supplies—has been difficult to overcome. Nonetheless, reliance on Russian energy supplies is not uniform across the Baltic States.
Owing to ample domestic energy supplies—shale oil and coal, respectively—
Estonia and Poland are among the least dependent on energy imports in the
European Union.70 However, they remain heavily dependent on Russia for other
energy supplies: in 2010 it provided 100 percent of Estonia’s gas and 54 percent
of Poland’s, in addition to 92 percent of Poland’s oil needs. Yet these portions of
their overall energy mix were 15 percent for Estonia and 39 percent for Poland—
a far cry from the total dependence that often is suggested. Lithuania and Latvia,
on the other hand, were almost entirely dependent on Russian gas, oil, coal,
and electricity in 2010.71 As the European Commission put it, excessive reliance
“on one single foreign supplier for oil and gas, the absence of any domestic energy source, and the lack of interconnections with other EU [European Union]
countries has further worsened the exposure of Lithuania to potential security
of supply risks and price shocks. . . . Excessive reliance on Russia is an issue that
Lithuania is trying to resolve.”72 Similar passages mark the section of the report
discussing Latvia. Overall, the ability of Russia to use the supply of different
forms of energy as part of a hybrid-warfare campaign varies across the vulnerable
parts of the region.
Port and Supply Chain
Ports and ships could be subject to sabotage and strikes using SOFs as part of
a hybrid offensive. Indeed, it is easy to imagine “little green men” or irregular
forces conducting operations against port facilities to disrupt operations and
trade, and hence the local economy. Yet conceivably the most serious threat could
come from cyber attacks, a concern that already animates much of the landwardresilience debate. Modern ports could not operate absent sophisticated computer
systems, while modern ships are increasingly automated to cut crew costs. As
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security pointed out in a 2016 report, a cyber
attack “on networks at a port or aboard a ship could result in lost cargo, port
disruptions, and physical and environmental damage depending on the systems
affected. The impact to operations at a port, which could last for days or weeks,
depends on the damage done to port networks and facilities.”73 Any prolonged
interference with the region’s maritime trade could impact industrial-production
flows and economic security severely.
The attacks that are known to have taken place against ports so far were
committed by hackers and other cyber criminals. Russia, however, deploys a
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sophisticated cyber-warfare capability that mounted a distributed-denial-ofservice (DDoS) attack against Estonia in 2007, effectively forcing it to decouple
itself from the Internet.74 Stockholm has accused Moscow of being behind the
cyber attack that closed down Sweden’s air traffic–control system for more than
five days in November 2015, forcing the cancelation of hundreds of domestic
and international flights, allegedly owing to Russia testing its electronic warfare
capabilities.75
Although most international attention has been directed at China’s cyber expertise, former U.S. director of national intelligence James Clapper believed that
Russia’s cyber threat exceeded the Chinese threat because it employed stealthier
and more-advanced methods of attack.76 Port operations present a vulnerable
target. Handling large numbers of different cargoes at once would be impossible
without sophisticated information-management systems.77 Disrupting their
complex and time-sensitive operations would have consequences nationally
and regionally. Blunt cyber instruments such as DDoS attacks have their uses,
but more-targeted tools, such as worms and viruses designed to take down port
operations selectively and even randomly, could result in billions of euros in lost
economic activity and generate social unrest as a consequence of the unavailability of food, medicine, and energy. This would serve the Kremlin’s aims ably,
constituting hybrid warfare with more deniability.78
Individual ships are also potentially at risk. The Baltic Sea is a major waterway,
with between two and four thousand commercial vessels in transit every day of
the year.79 The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) recently issued guidelines on maritime cyber security, in partnership with related maritime
trade bodies (Cruise Lines International Association, International Chamber
of Shipping, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners [known
as INTERTANKO], and its equivalent for dry cargoes [INTERCARGO]). The
guidelines make the point that, as “technology continues to develop, information
technology and operational technology onboard ships are increasingly being
networked together—and more frequently connected to the worldwide web,” and
attacks mounted against these systems could undermine the “safety and commercial operability” of ships.80 The list of onboard systems that could be manipulated
remotely to place ships at risk is long and growing.81
Thus, instead of disabling ships with gunfire or mines, anonymous cyber attacks could leave ships unable to navigate or maneuver, putting them at risk of
grounding and presenting a hazard to other shipping. Multiple such incidents
in the crowded waters of the Baltic Sea could result in ship operators and crews
refusing to serve Baltic Sea ports or marine insurers raising rates to prohibitive
levels in the face of an unsustainable aggregated risk.82
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OPERATIONALIZING MARITIME HYBRID WARFARE IN THE BSR
Broadly speaking, two scenarios for a Russian campaign in the BSR appear
possible:
• A low-key, possibly opportunistic campaign that, by exploiting real or
manufactured discontent among Russian compatriots to destabilize one or
more of the Baltic States, creates a “frozen conflict” that undermines NATO’s
credibility.
• A more structured, high-tempo campaign to achieve the same objectives
against NATO power in the BSR and also render Nordic defense cooperation
redundant.
It is reasonable to assume that the Baltic Sea Fleet and other organs of Russian maritime power would play supporting rather than leading roles in any such
conflict.
Russian Considerations
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Baltic Sea has become a vital conduit for Russian trade—one, moreover, that is close to important Western markets and (to date) untroubled by the risk of conflict. Prolonged interruptions in
flows of energy and goods would inflict considerable damage on Russia’s poorly
diversified economy. Russia recognizes that its lack of control over access to the
North Atlantic through the Danish straits renders it vulnerable in the event of
serious conflict. It does have an alternative—the White Sea Canal, which runs
from Saint Petersburg via Lake Ladoga—but this suffers from limited capacity, is
vulnerable to sabotage and air attack, and is icebound in winter.83
An additional complication—one that affects Russian naval as well as commercial shipping—is that the Soviet Union invested around 50 percent of its shipbuilding capacity in the Saint Petersburg area. A second vital facility, the Yantar
Shipyard, specializing in the construction of large surface ships, is located in the
Kaliningrad Oblast. Russia has made no attempt to dilute this concentration of
shipbuilding assets by moving them elsewhere.84
In 2015, the two containerports within what is known as “big port Saint Petersburg” handled 52 percent of Russian container traffic. This amounted to 1.9
times the throughput of Russia’s Far Eastern ports and more than three times
the volume passing through its Black Sea terminals. Further container traffic is
transshipped via Baltic State ports such as Riga in Latvia and Tallinn in Estonia.85
Europe remains, to date, a major customer for Russian crude oil. The bulk of
this traffic is shipped by tanker from the ports of Primorsk and Ust’-Luga near
Saint Petersburg via the Baltic to northwest Europe. However, volumes are declining, apparently because shipments to China are increasing.86 On the seabed
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is the Nord Stream gas pipeline. This consists of two parallel pipes that run from
Vyborg in Russia to Greifswald in Germany. The first came on stream in November 2011, the second almost a year later. It is currently the longest undersea
pipeline in the world. Despite EU sanctions following Russia’s annexation of
Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine that limited the volume of gas that could
be transmitted, volumes increased by 10 percent in 2015.87 Furthermore, negotiations continue for the laying of two further parallel pipelines in a project named
Nord Stream 2. The plan is controversial.88 If it overcomes opposition, it would
double the capacity of the system, meaning up to 110 billion cubic meters of gas
could be transmitted annually to the European market by 2019.89
This volume may be additive, but this is unlikely, given that its main purpose
appears to be to give Russia the option of shutting down its current pipeline network through Ukraine and other states for political reasons. Nord Stream and
other pipelines like it, such as the Turkish Stream, are strategically important to
Russia—and strategically perilous to the states in Russia’s near abroad—because
they would allow the Kremlin to cut off supplies to the border states it wished
to intimidate, while maintaining an uninterrupted supply to its key Western European markets.90 It is noteworthy that even when confronted by EU sanctions
imposed after the invasions of Ukraine, the Kremlin never suggested it would
retaliate against its prime Western European energy markets, while conversely
it has shown no compunction in wielding the energy weapon against Kiev, and
before that the Baltic States.91 Russia expresses this differently: it argues that by
linking Russia and Western Europe directly, EU states are no longer vulnerable to
supply disruptions caused by political difficulties in transit countries. This connection reinforces the dependency and mutual interest that already exist between
the EU and Russia and, in the absence of plans to balance European purchasing
power against Russian supplier demands, risks compromising Western European
responses to possible Russian aggression in CEE.
Mitigation Measures
Given the essentially political nature of hybrid war, many of the mitigation measures will focus on political, economic, and information outcomes. The suggestions advanced here draw on and add to two recently published policy proposals
—one from the EU entitled Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats: A
European Union Response, the second from NATO entitled “Resilience: A Core
Element of Collective Defence”—that contain suggestions adaptable to the maritime situation confronting the BSR states.92
Demonstrable Resolve
Russia needs to be convinced that all BSR states are committed to challenging
Russian aggression at sea. NATO has gone some way toward addressing this. The
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maritime component of the Readiness Action Plan on which NATO agreed at its
2014 summit includes intensified naval patrols in the Baltic (as well as the Black
and Mediterranean Seas), built around the Standing NATO Maritime and Mine
Countermeasures Groups; increased sorties by maritime patrol aircraft; and an
expansion of the annual BALTOPS naval and amphibious exercise, from thirteen nations in 2014 to seventeen in 2015 and 2016, including Sweden and Finland.93 However, BALTOPS still reflects the alliance’s focus on high-end military
operations.
Prior to Russia’s demonstration of its hybrid-warfare capabilities in Crimea
and Ukraine, the Baltic States perceived the possibility of a Russian ground
invasion as their most significant military threat. Consequently, the naval and
maritime-security forces of all three states have had to work with even more limited resources than the other military and security arms. Each state has chosen
to concentrate its naval capabilities on mine countermeasures, seeing this as an
affordable way to make a realistic contribution to NATO, while directing other
funds toward more constabulary-focused homeland- and maritime-security missions such as countersmuggling and fisheries and border protection.94
Hybrid Fusion Cell
The EU report recommends the establishment of a hybrid fusion cell to furnish
a single focus for the analysis of hybrid threats, established within the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (known as the EU INTCEN) of the European External Action Service.95
Given the position of the BSR on the front line of potential Russian aggression, it would be prudent to set up a BSR hybrid threats fusion cell at a secure
location within the region. The center could liaise with the EU hybrid fusion
cell and NATO, but also develop a specific understanding of potential threats
throughout the region and coordinate closely with regional states on relevant
early-warning indicators. The cell undoubtedly would find it useful to rebuild a
regional analytical capability focused on Russian priorities, motivation, capabilities, and planning.
The EU and NATO appear to have taken a first step in this direction by agreeing to establish a hybrid threats research center, based in Helsinki, Finland.96
Strategic Communications
As the EU report comments, perpetrators of hybrid threats “can systematically spread disinformation, including through targeted social media campaigns,
thereby seeking to radicalize individuals, destabilize society, and control the
political narrative. The ability to respond to hybrid threats by employing a sound
strategic communication strategy is essential. Providing swift factual responses
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and raising public awareness about hybrid threats are major factors for building
societal resilience.”97
Although each state will wish to conduct its own strategic communications
strategy, a regionally based center of excellence could act as a focal point for
exchange of best practice, audience research, and messaging, including how and
why Russian acts in the maritime domain can cause widespread instability.
Critical Infrastructure
It is widely recognized that the ability to maintain supplies of energy, food, potable water, and medical supplies as well as telecommunications links will be
critical to maintaining civilian morale and trust in government. In the Baltic
States, diversification of energy supplies away from exclusively Russian sources
is already under way.
A new facility for the import and regasification of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
has been built at Klaipeda in Lithuania; ensuring its security is vital. Further
diversification could be achieved if additional terminals were built in Estonia
and Latvia, with reversible-flow pipelines linking all three. Ideally, a trans-Baltic
pipeline should be built to link the Baltic States with the Swedish system (known
as Swedegas), which could transmit gas from its new terminal in Göteborg on
Sweden’s west coast in the event that LNG carriers were unable to pass through
the Danish straits.98 These pipelines would supplement the NordBalt power cable
laid between Sweden and Lithuania. Notably, Russian warships interfered with
this link on three occasions during its construction. In each case, Russia claimed
the area would be used for military exercises.99 Additional links should be laid
among Sweden, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia. The Baltic States also need to separate themselves from the Russian-dominated electricity grid known as BRELL
(for Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). The financial cost of doing so,
however, will be high, and it would incur further Russian displeasure, as the grid
currently carries Russian power to Kaliningrad.100
Protecting this largely maritime infrastructure would place a premium on effective Baltic Sea maritime domain awareness (MDA). Maritime patrol aircraft
(MPA) fleets have declined since the Cold War and need to be rebuilt. At the same
time, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have begun to share the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance burden previously carried by MPA aircraft alone.
BSR states currently lack experience with large, long-endurance UAVs, a capability gap they might fill by using the NATO-developed “lead nation” concept
to work alongside Poland, which wishes to acquire a fleet of medium-altitude,
long-endurance unmanned aircraft (known as MALEs).101
On the other hand, BSR states have three existing MDA frameworks: Surveillance Cooperation Finland-Sweden (SUCFIS), Sea Surveillance Co-operation
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Baltic Sea (SUCBAS), and the European Defence Agency’s Maritime Surveillance
(MARSUR). SUCFIS involves the automated exchange of daily reports and classified information between the military commands of Finland and Sweden.102
SUCBAS does not supplant this structure, but augments it by facilitating the
exchange of MDA data in unclassified form among all member states.103 It went
“live” in 2010. Russia was invited to join but declined.104 MARSUR enables the
“exchange of operational maritime information and services” so as to improve
maritime situational awareness, interoperability, and cooperation between EU
military and civilian maritime authorities and other international maritime
actors.105
However, the degree to which these multinational organizations and their
participating national MDA agencies are attuned to hybrid threats in the maritime domain and consequently the strength and efficiency with which they can
bridge the civil-maritime divide in their respective countries are areas where
further work may be needed. For instance, Russia could use normal commercial
ship movements to seed mines from nontraditional platforms. The Libyan navy
demonstrated that this was perfectly feasible when in 1984 it seeded the Red Sea
from the civilian ship Ghat, resulting in damage to twenty ships making their way
to or from the Suez Canal.106
Port and Supply Chain
In line with the steps laid out in the EU Maritime Security Strategy Action Plan,
BSR states need to place a strong emphasis on port and supply-chain security.
This must include defenses against cyber attacks. Although the maritime industry is taking steps to address the issue of cyber attacks on ports and shipping,
there currently is no focal point that brings government and industry together to
address the problem.
Russia considers itself to be a maritime power. It always has sought to control the
seas that give it access to the world ocean. The Baltic Sea is vital in this regard.
During the Cold War, the Soviet concept of “Baltic Sea: Sea of Peace” translated
into an assertion of Pax Sovietica that beguiled no one but fellow travelers as
Soviet submarines pursued it and NATO and Sweden contested it.
But Russian power, when compared with its Soviet predecessor, is sadly diminished. It is therefore understandable that Russia should continue to augment its
remaining military power with the measures of influence, deception, and covert
action that were so characteristic of the Soviet approach to interstate relations.
Russia’s methods in Crimea and Ukraine took NATO by surprise for a number
of reasons. The most serious was historical amnesia, because it led the alliance to
mischaracterize what was taking place as new. Even though NATO, and indeed
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almost all of Russia’s opponents since 1917, had experienced before the mix of
disguised SOF actions, deception, and misinformation to which the Russians
refer as reflexive control, NATO chose to refer to it by a new name: hybrid warfare. The alliance, Western governments, and the EU also have tended to focus
primarily on Russian military action when, in fact, conventional military forces
played a relatively insignificant role in what took place.107
Most of the troops involved—the “little green men” who appeared on the
streets of Sevastopol and elsewhere—were as much a part of the GRU (the Russian army foreign military intelligence agency) as they were the Russian army per
se. Certainly, the presence of Russian conventional forces was advertised widely
and was used as an escalatory threat, but the small number of conventional-force
units that were deployed operationally consisted largely of indirect-artillery-fire,
electronic-warfare, communications, logistical, and aerial-surveillance troops.
Any repetition of the Crimean model is likely to make similar use of conventional
forces. It will be a whole-of-government effort of political subversion and destabilization in which the conventional military—in contrast to SOFs and proxy
militia—will play a largely passive role until the last minute, unless the political
campaign fails and can be redeemed only by using conventional military force.
Whole-of-government aggression demands a whole-of-government response.
In this sense, there is no such thing as maritime hybrid warfare, certainly in
Russian political or military doctrine or practice. What states in the BSR may be
confronting even now, however, is a long-term campaign of politically motivated
societal disruption, aspects of which may occur in or from the maritime domain.
The seaborne aspects of the campaign will be maritime rather than exclusively
naval, in that what takes place could involve any of the ways people use the sea,
the seabed, and the airspace over them. Warships, submarines, and military aircraft will be involved, but so will fishing vessels, other ships, and ports, drawing
in coast guards and border forces along the way. Any disruptive campaign at sea
in the Baltic is likely to use conventional naval forces in ways that are analogous
to the background role that ground forces played during the Crimea invasion and
the eastern Ukraine intervention.
BSR states are already alert for signs of disruption instigated and sustained
by any aspect of Russian state power anywhere on their territories, but they
must ensure that their vigilance does not stop at the coast. Russia has a powerful
vested interest in the safe movement of its goods and raw materials through the
Baltic Sea; but then, so does China in the safe movement of its goods, especially
its energy imports, through the South China Sea, yet this has not stopped it
from conducting a campaign of political and territorial disruption that has antagonized its regional neighbors, its trading partners, and the United States. The
transition from a sea of peace to a sea of war could be slow and subtle or quick
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and merciless; either way, both NATO and the states surrounding the Baltic Sea
need to be prepared.
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